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CIVIL EVIDENCE
John W. Bickel II *
William A. Brewer III**
URING the Survey period, the rules of evidence underwent their
usual heavy scrutiny in the appellate courts of Texas and federal
courts in the Fifth Circuit. In discussing some of the more interest-
ing and instructive cases construing both the Texas Rules of Civil Evidence
(Texas Rule(s)) and the Federal Rules of Evidence (Federal Rule(s)), the
authors have organized this Article sequentially according to the order of
the evidentiary rules.
I. ARTICLE I - GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article I of the Texas Rules contains a number of general provisions.
Among them is Rule 103, which governs the general procedures required to
make and preserve objections.' During the Survey period there were a
number of published opinions which underscored the fact that a litigant
must establish a complete record to preserve an evidentiary objection for
appeal.
Texas Rule 103(a) provides that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected .... -"2 During the Survey period, the supreme court reiter-
ated its previous provision that erroneously admitted evidence that is not
dispositive of the case or is merely cumulative of previously admitted evi-
dence, constitutes only harmless error.3 In Castro v. Sebesta4 the Houston
court of appeals (1st Dist.) held that a party need not prove that a different
judgment would have resulted if the evidence had not been erroneously ex-
cluded.5 Rather, the party need only show that an improper judgment prob-
*B.S. United States Military Academy at West Point, J.D. Southern Methodist Univer-
sity School of Law. Partner, Bickel & Brewer.
** B.A. cum laude, St. John's University. J.D. cum laude, Albany Law School of Union
University LL.M. in Trade Regulation, New York University. Partner, Bickel & Brewer.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the significant contribution of Eric G. Calhoun, an as-
sociate with Bickel & Brewer.
1. See TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 103.
2. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 103(a). See also TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(l) (No judgment will be
reversed unless the asserted error of law amounted to such a denial of rights as was reasonably
calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an improper judgment, or was such
that it probably prevented the appellant from making a proper presentation of the case to the
appellate court.)
3. Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226, 230 (Tex. 1990).
4. 808 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
5. Id. at 192.
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ably resulted.6 Although the distinction is subtle, it is significant to the
appellant in that it affords a slightly greater theoretical opportunity for a
litigant seeking to reverse a trial court on the basis that it kept out certain
crucial evidence.
However, to preserve its appellate rights, the litigant must be mindful of
Texas Rule 103(a)(2). Rule 103(a)(2) provides that in the case of alleged
error based upon the exclusion of evidence by the trial court, the substance
of the evidence must be made known to the court by offer of proof in order
to preserve the error for appeal. 7 During the Survey period, the breadth of
Rule 103(a)(2) was reaffirmed by the Dallas court of appeals when it held
that where a party obtains a preliminary adverse ruling on a motion in
limine, the party must offer the evidence at trial in order to preserve the
error for appeal.8
Texas Rule 103(a)(1) provides that an objection to a ruling admitting evi-
dence may not be a predicate for error unless "a timely objection or motion
to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context." 9 In order to insure its
preservation, a valid objection should include a citation to the particular rule
of evidence alleged to be violated by admission of that evidence.' 0 For ex-
ample, in Smith Motor Sales " I the Austin court of appeals held that a gen-
eral objection to the admission of a market survey on the ground that it
constituted hearsay was insufficient under Rule 103(a) to preserve the appel-
lant's hearsay objection. 12 The court declared that the use of the term
"hearsay," without specific reference to both a legal basis and how it applied
to the offered exhibit, failed to preserve the objection for review. 13
Federal Rule 103(a)(1) contains language identical to that found in the
first sentence of Texas Rule 103(a)(1) quoted above. 14 During the Survey
period, the Fifth Circuit held that where an objection to the admission of
evidence was made on the record, but the basis for the objection and the
ruling were made at a bench conference off the record, the objection was not
preserved for appeal. 15
Texas Rule 104(a) provides that a trial court, when making preliminary
6. Id.
7. TEX. R. CIv. EVID. 103(a)(2).
8. Methodist Hosps. v. Corporate Communicators, Inc., 806 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied). Of course, if a trial court hears objections to offered evi-
dence out of the presence of the jury, the objections are deemed to apply to such evidence
without the necessity of repetition when the evidence is subsequently admitted before the jury.
See TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(l).
9. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 103(a)(l).
10. City of Mesquite v. Moore, 800 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ);
see Smith Motor Sales, Inc. v. Texas Motor Vehicle Comm'n., 809 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
11. 809 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, writ denied).
12. Id. at 272.
13. Id.
14. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1).




determinations of admissibility, is not bound by the rules of evidence except
for those governing privileges. 16 Accordingly, evidence not otherwise ad-
missible may be considered by the trial judge in making a preliminary deter-
mination of admissibility. Litigants should know, however, that some
common law requirements may have survived the implementation of the
Texas rules. For example, in Utica National Insurance Co. v. McDonald 17
the Fort Worth court of appeals held, in a fire insurance case, that the ad-
vent of Texas Rule 104(a) did not change the common law requirement that
hearsay evidence of conspiracy can be admitted only when accompanied by
tangible, material evidence of conspiracy.' 8
Finally, Texas Rule 106 requires the admission of any part of a writing or
statement sought to be introduced by a party which ought to be considered
contemporaneously with the offered portion of such writing or statement. 19
In Meuth v. Hartgrove20 the Austin court of appeals explained that Texas
Rule 106 does not, however, require that a writing or recording be excluded
if it evidences only part of an occurrence. 2 1 Rather, Rule 106 provides for
the admission of a complete document or recording, or of related documents
or recordings, at the same time that the incomplete document or recording is
being offered. 22
II. ARTICLE II - JUDICIAL NOTICE
During the Survey period, Texas courts had occasion to apply the rules
pertaining to the manner by which trial and appellate courts may take judi-
cial notice. The Supreme Court of Texas, applying Texas Rules 201(b) and
(c), held that a trial court could properly take judicial notice that a particu-
lar day was not a statutory holiday in order to determine that service of
citation was made during business hours. 23
Texas Rule 201(0 provides that "U]udicial notice may be taken at any
stage of the proceeding."' 24 The Fort Worth court of appeals recently used
Rule 201(0 in taking judicial notice of an adjudicative fact for the first time
on appeal. 25 Despite this, the Fort Worth court has held that in reviewing a
record, it will not infer that a trial judge took judicial notice.26 The Beau-
mont court, however, took a different stance when it stated that even with-
out any indication in the record from below, a trial court faced with
16. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 104(a).
17. 814 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ requested).
18. Id. at 236.
19. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 106.
20. 811 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
21. Id. at 629.
22. Id.
23. Higginbotham v. General Life & Accident Ins. Co., 796 S.W.2d 695, 696 (Tex. 1990).
24. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 201(f).
25. Trapnell v. John Hogan Interests, Inc., 809 S.W.2d 606, 608 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1991, writ denied); see also City of Mesquite v. Moore, 800 S.W.2d 617, 619 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1990, no writ) (Judicial notice of population of City of Mesquite taken for the
first time on appeal).
26. Sansom v. Sprinkle, 799 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ).
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calculating an award of attorneys' fees will be presumed to have taken judi-
cial notice of the file before him, the proceedings conducted in his presence,
and the usual and customary attorneys' fees for the claim involved. 27
Texas Rule 202 provides that a court may take judicial notice of the law of
another jurisdiction.28 During the Survey period, the Corpus Christi court
of appeals noted that once the requirements for judicial notice under the law
of another jurisdiction are met, the trial court is presumed to have the same
knowledge of that jurisdiction's law as of its own law.29 Nonetheless, cases
decided during the Survey period underscore that the practitioner should be
wary of the application of Rule 202. The San Antonio court of appeals held
that Rule 202 does not permit a trial court to take judicial notice of "pri-
vate" orders, such as a stipulated order signed by a governmental agency. 30
In O'Connor v. Sam Houston Medical Hospital, Inc.31 the Houston court of
appeals (1st Dist.) held that it could not judicially notice local court rules on
appeal unless a certified copy was provided to the court.32 However, the
other Houston court of appeals (14th Dist.) held that it would take judicial
notice of a domestic judgment without a party having offered the document
sought to be noticed. 33
Ordinarily, an appellate court will only take judicial notice of facts outside
the record for purposes of determining jurisdiction over an appeal or to re-
solve matters ancillary to decisions which are mandated by law.34 Appellate
courts are reluctant to take judicial notice of matters which go to the merits
of a dispute. 35 Accordingly, in SEI Business Systems the Dallas court of
appeals refused to take judicial notice that a corporation had changed its
name, despite being provided with a certified copy of an amendment to the
corporation's articles of incorporation, because the identity of the corpora-
tion was a question of fact for the trial court.36  Finally, Texas Rule 204
provides that a court may take judicial notice of the ordinances of munici-
palities in Texas. 37 Yet, one court of appeals held that in order for such
ordinances to be judicially noticed, the proponent must provide the court
with either authenticated or certified copies, or a proper citation to enable
verification of unauthenticated copies. 38
27. Lacy v. First Nat'l Bank, 809 S.W.2d 362, 367 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, no writ).
28. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 202.
29. State Nat'l Bank v. Academia, Inc., 802 S.W.2d 282, 290 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1990, writ denied).
30. Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 810 S.W.2d 812, 824 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ
granted).
31. 802 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 807
S.W.2d 574 (Tex. 1991).
32. Id. at 252.
33. Langdale v. Villamil, 813 S.W.2d 187, 190 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no
writ).
34. SEI Business Systems, Inc. v. Bank One Texas, 803 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1991, no writ).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 204.
38. Hollingsworth v. King, 810 S.W.2d 772, 774 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1991), writ denied
per curiam, 816 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1991).
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III. ARTICLE III - BURDENS OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
Federal Rule 301 governs presumptions generally in civil actions and pro-
ceedings in federal court.39 Federal Rule 302 provides that "the effect of a
presumption respecting a fact which is an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision is determined in accordance
with State law." 40 Hence, Texas substantive law affects the operation of
presumptions in both state and federal courts. Article III of the Texas Rules
does not contain any rules at this time. Therefore, various Texas statutes
and common law govern burdens of proof and presumptions. The cases re-
ported during the survey period illustrate the interrelated nature of pre-
sumptions and burdens.
In State v. Seventeen Thousand and No/100 4 1 the Corpus Christi court of
appeals reconfirmed that a defendant moving for summary judgment has the
burden of showing that at least one element of the plaintiff's cause of action
has been conclusively established against plaintiff.42 If defendant accom-
plishes that task, plaintiff then has the burden of introducing evidence suffi-
cient to raise an issue of fact with respect to that element.4 3 Defendant
cannot satisfy his burden by showing that plaintiff does not have sufficient
evidence at the time of summary judgment to prove an element of a claim. 44
The Corpus Christi court reversed the trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment because defendant failed to provide affirmative summary judgment evi-
dence negating a specific element of plaintiff's claim.4 5
In a workers compensation case, the burden is on an employee who has
worked less than 210 days to establish her average weekly wage. 46 In Trans-
america Insurance Co. v. Green 47 the Corpus Christi court of appeals stated
that in order to do so, the employee has the burden of introducing evidence
of the average daily wage of an employee of her same class, in the same or
similar employment, in the same or a neighboring place, who had worked at
least 210 days during the year preceding the claimant's injury.48 The
Corpus Christi court reversed the claimant's verdict because the evidence
submitted to the jury improperly assumed that the testifying employee was
in the same class as the claimant and the claimant had the burden of proof
on this issue. 49
Hot Shot Messenger Service, Inc. v. State 50 involved the presumption that
a letter properly addressed, stamped and mailed is presumed to have been
39. FED. R. EvID. 301.
40. FED. R. EvID. 302.
41. 809 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
42. Id. at 639.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 640.
45. Id.
46. See Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Green, 797 S.W.2d 171, 173 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1990, no writ) (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309 § 1(1)-(3) (Vernon 1967)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 174-75.
50. 798 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
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received by the addressee in due course. 51 After a default judgment was
entered against the appellant,52 a notice containing a reference to the judg-
ment was placed in the mail addressed to appellant's post office box, thereby
giving rise to the presumption of receipt.53
In Lorentzen v. Kliesing54 the trial court entered a default judgment
against defendant when she failed to appear for trial.5" Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 21a creates a presumption that notice of a trial setting has been
duly received when the notice was properly addressed and mailed to the
party. 56 But the Houston court of appeals reversed the trial court, holding
that the presumption of receipt was effectively rebutted by defendant's sworn
testimony that she did not receive notice.57
In Garcia v. City of Houston 58 the El Paso court of appeals addressed the
presumption that an employee driving a company vehicle is acting in the
course of his employment when involved in an accident. 59 Once the em-
ployer presents evidence that the employee is not so engaged, the presump-
tion is overcome and the burden shifts to the injured party to show that the
employee was acting within the scope of his employment. 60
In Miller v. Kendall61 plaintiff brought an action against his former part-
ner, alleging breach of fiduciary duty based upon self-dealing. 62 The Hous-
ton court of appeals noted that, under Texas law, once a fiduciary
relationship is pleaded and shown, the burden of proving the fairness of a
transaction is upon the fiduciary party who entered into it.63
In Amis v. Ashworth 64 the underlying action involved a claim and cross-
claim for assault, arising from an altercation between the parties.65 The
relator sought review by the court of appeals of an order by the trial court
directing him to submit to a mental examination. 66 The Tyler court of ap-
peals stated that a party moving for a compulsory mental examination bears
the burden of proving that the opponent's mental condition is in controversy
and that good cause exists for the examination. 67 The Tyler court granted a
conditional writ of mandamus because, although the relator's "state of
mind" at the time of the alleged assault may have been in issue, the movant
had neither shown how the relator's current "mental health" was "in con-
51. Id. at 415.
52. Id. at 414.
53. Id. at 415.
54. 810 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
55. Id. at 18.
56. Tex. R. Civ. P. 21a; see Lorentzen, 810 S.W.2d at 19.
57. 810 S.W.2d at 20.
58. 799 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ denied).
59. Id. at 498.
60. Id.
61. 804 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ).
62. Id. at 936.
63. Id. at 939.
64. 802 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1990, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
65. Id. at 375.




troversy," nor proferred any evidence of a mental defect. 68
Finally, the Fort Worth court of appeals discussed how burdens of proof
affect the phraseology for raising points of error on appeal. In Cockrell v.
Citizens National Bank 69 the Fort Worth court of appeals observed that
when a party having the burden of proof on a jury question appeals from an
adverse fact finding, the appropriate statement of the point of error is that
the jury's finding was "against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence."' 70 Conversely, the party without the burden of proof on an ad-
versely determined jury question should refer to the asserted point of error
as "insufficient evidence" to support the jury's finding.7 '
IV. ARTICLE IV - RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
For the practitioner, one of the most heavily debated concepts is that of
relevancy. During the Survey period, a number of opinions considered the
interplay of relevancy and countervailing policies against disclosure. Of
course, the oft-stated boundary of what is relevant is some logical connec-
tion, either directly or by inference, between the proferred evidence and the
ultimate fact to be proved. 72 In Trans-State Pavers, Inc. v. Haynes7 3 the
Beaumont court of appeals reversed a lower court which excluded evidence
that the plaintiff-driver had been drinking immediately prior to being in-
volved in a one-vehicle accident. 74 The court noted that while evidence of
alcohol consumption standing alone is inadmissible unless there is further
evidence of negligence or improper conduct on the part of the user,7 5 evi-
dence of alcohol consumption was relevant here because it bore on the issues
of causation and contributory negligence.
76
In Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool 77 an asbestos product liability case, the Texar-
kana court of appeals held that certain letters between unrelated third par-
ties were relevant to show the state of scientific knowledge concerning the
hazards of asbestos during the 1930s and 40s.78 The court held that any
unfair prejudice to defendant from admitting the letters did not outweigh
their overall probative value.7 9 The court also ruled that autopsy photo-
graphs of the individual upon whose death a claim was based were relevant
to the issue of the cause of the individual's death.80 The court stated the
general rule that photographs relevant to any issue in the case are admissi-
68. Id. at 378-79.
69. 802 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ requested).
70. Id. at 324.
71. Id.
72. Cooke v. Dykstra, 800 S.W.2d 556, 563 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, no
writ), opinion corrected and modified on rehearing, 1990 WL 310627 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1990, no writ).
73. 808 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
74. Id. at 731.
75. Id. at 733.
76. Id.
77. 813 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
78. Id. at 668-70.
79. Id. at 669.
80. Id. at 673.
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ble,8 1 and held that "[tihe fact that photographs are gruesome does not
render them inadmissible. ' 82 Specifically, the court held that the photo-
graphs were admissible to assist an expert in explaining and supporting his
opinion that asbestos, and not lung cancer, was the cause of the individual's
death.83
In Castro v. Sebesta 84 the Houston court of appeals held that it was error
to exclude photographs of the scene of an automobile accident. The court
stated that the photographs would have helped the jury to better understand
the accident and the harm caused by defendant's conduct.8 5 Defendant,
while smoking marijuana, drove head-on into an oncoming car, killing two
people and seriously injuring seven others.8 6 Prior to trial, defendant stipu-
lated to actual negligence, gross negligence and proximate causation. 87 Ap-
plying Texas Rule 404(b), the Houston court held that the trial court
improperly excluded testimony that defendant had a history of using and
selling drugs and had smoked marijuana in the past while driving.8 8 The
court determined that defendant's indifference to the dangers of driving
while smoking marijuana was relevant to the degree of culpability of defend-
ant and, hence, the determination of punitive damages.8 9 The Houston ap-
pellate court also held that defendant's driving record was relevant and
admissible to show the context of his actions on the night of the accident. 90
In Texas Department of Human Services v. White 9 1 a case involving invol-
untary termination of a mother's parental rights, the trial court had admit-
ted a staged photograph of the daughter and the foster family. 92 The
Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Dallas court of appeals' finding that it
was reversible error to admit a staged photograph.93 The Dallas court,
based on Texas Rule 403, had determined that the prejudicial effect of the
photograph greatly outweighed its probative value. 94 However, the Supreme
Court of Texas stated that, based on the record as a whole, the parent failed
to show that its admission probably did cause the rendition of an improper
verdict.95 Hence, no reversible error existed. 96
81. Id. at 671.
82. Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool, 813 S.W.2d 658, 671 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ)
(citing Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n. v. Crow, 218 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1949), aff'd, 148 Tex. 113, 221 S.W.2d 235 (1949)).
83. Id. at 673.
84. 808 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1991, no writ).
85. Id. at 193.
86. Id. at 191.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 194.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 195.
91. 817 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1991).
92. Id. at 63.
93. Id.
94. Vanessa W. v. Texas Dept. of Human Servs., 810 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. App.-Dallas
1991), rev'd, 817 S.W.2d 62 (Tex. 1991).
95. 817 S.W.2d at 63.
96. See TEX. R. App. P. 81(b)(1).
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In Davis v. Davis97 the Corpus Christi court of appeals noted that evidence
which is otherwise admissible may not be excluded in a civil case because it
has been wrongfully obtained. 98 Similarly, in Barham v. Turner Construc-
tion Co. 99 the Dallas court of appeals held that the trial court properly ad-
mitted photographs, which arguably may have been obtained in violation of
Displinary Rule 7-104,100 to impeach a plaintiff's testimony concerning the
extent of his injuries. 10 1
Texas Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity therewith."' 10 2 In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
Vollmer 103 the Corpus Christi court of appeals noted that, as a general rule,
prior acts of a party with persons unrelated to the case at bar are inadmissi-
ble on the grounds of relevancy, materiality and prejudice. 1°4 But, in deter-
mining that the trial court properly excluded similar acts evidence, the court
of appeals noted that this type of evidence may be used if the proponent
establishes the required predicate; specifically, (1) the existence of similar or
reasonably similar conditions; (2) a special connection between the present
act and prior acts; and (3) that the acts occurred by means of the same
instrumentality. 05
Texas Rule 405(b) provides that where the "character or a trait of charac-
ter of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, proof
may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct."' 1 6 In Eoff
v. Hal & Charlie Peterson Foundation 107 a negligence case brought by a pa-
tient against an emergency room physician and a hospital, the San Antonio
court of appeals held that once plaintiff had placed the character of the doc-
tor in issue by questioning him on cross-examination concerning his prepara-
tion, experience and ability, the hospital could properly call several
physicians to testify as to the doctor's reputation as an emergency room
physician. 10 8
Texas Rule 407(a) provides that evidence of subsequent remedial meas-
ures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct, but that it
may be admissible for some other purpose. 109 In E. V.R. II Associates v.
97. 801 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
98. Id. at 23.
99. 803 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
100. Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-104 (repealed
effective Jan. 1, 1990 by order of the Supreme Court of Texas dated Oct. 17, 1989).
101. Barham, 803 S.W.2d at 740. But see, Schenck v. Ebby Halliday Real Estate, Inc., 803
S.W. 2d 361 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, no writ), in which the Fort Worth court of appeals
held that an appraisal obtained by trespass could be excluded as a discovery sanction. See TEX.
R. Civ. P. 215(3).
102. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 404(b).
103. 805 S.W.2d 825 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ requested).
104. Id. at 831.
105. Id. at 831-32.
106. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 405(b).
107. 811 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
108. Id. at 197.
109. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 407(a).
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Brundige"10 a slip and fall case, the Dallas court of appeals held that the
trial court properly admitted into evidence photographs showing that a
crack in the sidewalk, where plaintiff claimed he fell, had been repaired."'
The Dallas court presumed the trial judge found that the pictures would
assist the jury to understand the lay of the land, the proximity of nearby
structures and other matters relevant to the jury's determination." 2 The
court of appeals also noted that those photographs were the only known
pictures of the scene where plaintiff claimed to have fallen." 13
Texas Rule 408 states the general rule that settlement negotiations are
inadmissible to prove liability." 4 The rule also provides that evidence of-
fered for some other purpose is not required to be excluded. I5 In Haney v.
Purcell Co. 116 plaintiffs' counsel presented a copy of the movie "Poltergeist"
to defendants' attorneys at a settlement conference.' 7 When plaintiff was
asked on the stand if her attorneys took the movie to the settlement confer-
ence, she responded that she did not know. " 8 The trial court then sustained
an objection to questioning concerning the movie on the basis that it was
related to pretrial settlement." 9 During subsequent examination of Ms. Ha-
ney, however, the trial court overruled a similar objection to further ques-
tioning concerning the delivery of the movie.' 20 The court of appeals
overruled plaintiffs' point of error challenging the admission of statements
concerning the movie. The court reasoned that plaintiffs failed to show that
the presentation of the movie was part of the settlement negotiations and
that it was not offered at trial for some other purpose.' 2'
In C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson ' 22 the Houston court of appeals
also discussed the different types of settlement agreements, holding that the
trial court properly excluded a settlement agreement which neither gave the
settling defendants a financial stake in any eventual recovery by plaintiffs
against the other defendants, nor created a misalignment of the parties. 23
The Houston court distinguished "Mary Carter" settlement agreements,
which give the settling defendant a financial stake in plaintiff's recovery, and
are admissible to show the interest or bias of a co-defendant. 24
In White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Ven-
110. 813 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
111. Id. at 556-57.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 556.
114. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 408.
115. Id.
116. 796 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ denied).




121. Id. at 789-90.
122. 810 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ requested).
123. Id. at 270.
124. Id. at 269.
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ture 125 however, the Beaumont court of appeals held that a "Mary Carter"
agreement was not admissible to show bias on the part of a witness where
the settling tort-feasor did not actually remain a party to the suit at the time
of trial. 126 The court held that the rationale for admission of "Mary Carter"
settlement agreements was not applicable in that case because there was no
misalignment of the parties or misconception of the litigants' respective posi-
tions.127 The appellate court therefore affirmed the exclusion of the "Mary
Carter" agreement offered to show bias on the part of a witness despite the
witness' potential financial interest in the outcome of the trial.' 28
Evidence that a person possesses liability insurance coverage is generally
not admissible to show whether that person acted wrongfully. 129 Evidence
of insurance, however, is admissible under Texas Rule 411 if offered regard-
ing some other issue relevant to the case.' 30 For example, in Meuth v. Hart-
grove 131 the Austin court of appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of
insurance certificates to rebut appellant's denial of ownership of an entity. 132
Finally, in Eoff v. Hal & Charlie Peterson Foundation 133 the San Antonio
court of appeals held that it was not error for the trial court to exclude
evidence of a hospital's liability insurance after a witness for the hospital
testified that it was a charitable institution.134 Specifically, the court deter-
mined that testimony concerning the hospital's status as a non-profit charita-
ble institution did not open the door to admission of the fact that the
hospital carried liability insurance, because its non-profit status was not rele-
vant to its liability for damages. 135
V. ARTICLE V - PRIVILEGES
During the Survey period there were a number of cases that the practi-
tioner should be aware of in determining the scope of a number of eviden-
tiary privileges. The rules contained in article V explain the scope of some of
these evidentiary privileges, including reports privileged by statute,' 36 the
lawyer-client privilege, 137 the husband-wife communication privilege,' 38 the
communications to clergyman privilege, 139 the political vote privilege,140 the
125. 798 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990), writ dism'd, 811 S.W.2d 541, cert de-
nied, 112 S.Ct. 180 (1991).
126. Id. at 814-15.
127. Id. at 815.
128. Id. at 814-15.
129. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 411.
130. Id.
131. 811 S.W.2d 626 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied).
132. Id. at 628.
133. 811 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
134. Id. at 197.
135. Id.
136. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 502.
137. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 503.
138. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 504.
139. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 505.
140. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 506.
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privilege not to disclose trade secrets,141 the privilege of the government not
to reveal the identity of an informer, 142 the physician-patient privilege, 143
and the privilege relating to mental health information. 1"
In Axelson, Inc. v. Mcllhany 145 the trial court denied discovery of an in-
ternal investigation performed by one of defendants in part on the ground
that it was protected by attorney-client privilege. 146 The Supreme Court of
Texas reversed, noting that any claim of privilege had been waived under
Texas Rule 511, because there was evidence that the investigation was dis-
closed to the FBI, IRS and the Wall Street Journal.147
In Enron Oil and Gas Co. v. Flores 148 the San Antonio court of appeals
reviewed an order of the trial court granting discovery of documents, which
the relator asserted contained privileged trade secrets, and which the trial
court granted discovery of without first having viewed the documents in
camera to determine whether they should be protected.149 The court cited
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(4) 150 for the proposition that an in cam-
era review is not automatically required whenever a privilege with respect to
documents is claimed. 151 The rules require the trial court to weigh the need
for discovery against the desirability of preserving the secrecy of the material
in question before permitting disclosure. 152 The court of appeals determined
that the trial court had received sufficient testimony concerning the docu-
ments to enable it to issue the discovery order without first reviewing the
documents in camera. 153
In State v. Lowry 154 the Supreme Court of Texas considered the scope of
the informant and investigative privileges available to the Attorney General
of Texas. 155 In the underlying matter, an antitrust action by the State
against a number of insurers, the trial court ordered the Attorney General to
produce documents obtained through civil investigative demands and re-
quired the identification of the authors of citizen complaint letters. 156 In the
mandamus proceeding before the supreme court, the Attorney General as-
serted a statutory privilege against disclosure of investigative materials, cit-
ing the Texas Business and Commerce Code section 15.10(i). 157 Section
15.10 permits disclosure if ordered by a court for good cause shown.158 The
141. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 507.
142. TEX. R. Civ. EviD. 508.
143. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 509.
144. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 510.
145. 798 S.W.2d 550 (Tex. 1990).
146. Id. at 553-54.
147. Id. at 554.
148. 810 S.W.2d 408 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, orig. proceeding [leave denied]).
149. Id. at 410-11.
150. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166b(4).
151. Id.; Enron Oil and Gas Co., 810 S.W.2d at 413.
152. Id. at 413.
153. Id.
154. 802 S.W.2d 669 (Tex. 1991, orig. proceeding).
155. Id. at 673-74.
156. Id. at 670.
157. Id. at 671.
158. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.10 (Vernon 1987).
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supreme court rejected the insurers' argument that the permissive discovery
language found in the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure overrides the confiden-
tiality provisions of section 15.10.159 Nonetheless, the court found that the
insurers had demonstrated good cause for disclosure by showing that they
had a substantial need of the materials and were unable to obtain the materi-
als by other means. 6°
The Attorney General also sought to protect portions of complaint letters
that would identify the authors, unless their consent had been obtained.1 61
The court stated that the informant privilege under Texas Rule 508 requires
a showing that the author provided information assisting in the investigation
of a possible violation of the law to a law enforcement officer. 162 Despite the
failure of the Attorney General to offer any factual predicate for the privi-
lege, the supreme court held that it was error for the trial court to order
production of the letters without first reviewing them in camera to determine
whether the letters themselves established the required foundation for exert-
ing the informant privilege.1 63
Eoff v. Hal and Charlie Peterson Foundation 164 presents a seemingly
anomalous look at Texas Rule 509. In that case, defendant offered the medi-
cal records of one of plaintiff's witnesses for purposes of impeaching the
witness' testimony. 165 Rule 509 provides that "[r]ecords of the identity, di-
agnosis, evaluation, or treatment of a patient by a physician that are created
or maintained by a physician are confidential and privileged and may not be
disclosed." 166 When the witnesses' medical records were offered, plaintiff's
counsel objected.' 67 Despite this the trial court held that because counsel for
plaintiffs did not represent the witness, counsel was not qualified to claim the
privilege.' 68 Texas Rule 509(c)(1) provides that the privilege may only be
claimed by the patient or by a representative of the patient acting on the
patient's behalf.169 A further look at the physician-patient relationship is
presented by Garay v. County of Bexar.170 In that case the San Antonio
court of appeals stated the rule that the physician-patient relationship is con-
tractual, wholly voluntary and is created by agreement, either express or
implied. 171 The court appears to have held that although the patient at issue
was unconscious at the time and could not agree to the medical examina-
tion, a physician-patient relationship was established because medical per-
sonnel had the responsibility to examine the patient.' 72
159. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d at 672.
160. Id. at 673 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 166b(3)).
161. Id.
162. Id.; see TEx. R. Civ. EvID. 508(a).
163. Lowry, 802 S.W.2d at 673.
164. 811 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ).
165. Id. at 194.
166. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 509(b)(2).
167. Eoff, 811 S.W.2d at 195.
168. Id.
169. TEX. R. CIv. EViD. 509(c)(1).
170. 810 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).




Texas Rule 510 provides that the records of the identity, diagnosis, evalu-
ation or treatment of a patient kept by a "professional" are confidential and
shall not be disclosed. 173 In Dossey v. Salazar174 the Houston court of ap-
peals considered the exception found in Texas Rule 5 10(d)(5), which permits
disclosure of records regarding the physical, mental or emotional condition
of a patient in a proceeding where the party relies upon the condition as a
part of the party's claim or defense.' 75 The court noted that Rule 5 10(d)(5)
is intended to prevent the offensive use of the physician-patient privilege,
such as where a party places his mental or physical condition at issue and
then attempts to use the privilege to conceal evidence of that condition. 176
Here, the court reversed the trial court's broad discovery order on the
ground that defendant had not placed his mental condition in issue.' 77
VI. ARTICLE VI - WITNESSES
During the Survey period there were a number of cases which emphasize
for the trial practitioner the opportunities and restrictions which arise under
Article VI in determining witnesses at trial. Texas Rule 601(a) states the
general rule that every person is competent to be a witness except as other-
wise provided in the Rules of Evidence.' 78 For example, in Mobil Oil Corp.
v. Floyd 179 a personal injury case sounding in negligence, Mobil sought a
writ of mandamus to reverse the trial court's denial of its motion to compel
the deposition of the injured party.180 In a prior proceeding, the injured
party had been declared non compos mentis and a permanent guardian was
appointed for him.181 Mobil argued that the injured party was not per se
"insane" within the meaning of Texas Rule 601(a)(1). 18 2 The Beaumont
court of appeals agreed and held that the fact of a guardianship does not
automatically render a party-witness incompetent to testify, it merely creates
a presumption of incompetency. 183 The court reserved, however, until trial,
the determination of the admissibility of the testimony at trial. 184
Texas Rule 601(b) is the present version of the Dead Man's Statute in
173. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 510(b)(2).
174. 808 S.W.2d 146 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, orig. proceeding [leave
denied]).
175. Id. at 147; TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 510(d)(5).
176. Dossey, 808 S.W.2d at 147.
177. Id. at 148.
178. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 601(a).
179. 810 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, orig. proceeding).
180. Id. at 323.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 323-24.
183. Id. The court of appeals also emphasized that a party to a suit ordinarily has the right
to depose an opposing party, citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 200(1). Id. at 323.
184. Id. at 324.
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Texas.18 5 In Quitta v. Fossatti18 6 the Corpus Christi court of appeals con-
strued Rule 601(b) narrowly, holding that it did not prevent a tenant from
testifying as to oral agreements between a tenant and his deceased land-
lord.' 87 Specifically, the court found that Rule 601(b) did not apply because
the opposing parties were neither heirs nor legal representatives of the de-
ceased, but were co-owners of the leased property.8 8 The court stated that
even assuming Rule 601(b) applied, there was sufficient independent cor-
roborating evidence in the form of testimony from the decedent's brother
that was consistent with the existence of an alleged oral modification of the
lease. 189
Texas Rule 603 and its counterpart Federal Rule 603 provide that before
testifying, a witness is required to make an oath or affirmation that she will
testify truthfully.190 In Ferguson v. Commissioner'9' the Tax Court dis-
missed a taxpayer's lawsuit for lack of prosecution after she refused on reli-
gious grounds to swear or affirm prior to giving testimony.192 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that the judge erred by summarily dismissing the
taxpayer's religious beliefs and by conditioning her right to testify on what
she perceived as a violation of those beliefs. 193
Texas Rule 607 provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked
by any party.' 94 In Trans-State Pavers, Inc. v. Haynes' 9 5 the Beaumont
court of appeals held that it was error for the trial court to exclude evidence
of alcohol consumption by the driver of an automobile involved in an acci-
dent once he had denied taking anything that would have affected his ability
to drive safely. 196 The court determined that the failure by the trial court to
permit impeachment of the driver with respect to his consumption of alcohol
was reversible error. 197
During the Survey period, amendments to Federal Rule 609(a), which
concerns impeachment by evidence of conviction of a crime, became effec-
185. See Quitta v. Fossati, 808 S.W.2d 636, 641 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, writ
denied). Rule 601(b) provides in part:
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in which judg-
ment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither party shall be al-
lowed to testify against the others as to any oral statement by the testator,
intestate or ward, unless that testimony to the oral statement is corroborated or
unless the witness is called at the trial to testify thereto by the opposite party;
and, the provisions of this article shall extend to and include all actions by or
against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent based in whole or in part
on such oral statement.
TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 601(b).
186. 808 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
187. Id. at 641.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 641-42.
190. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 603; FED. R. EvID. 603.
191. 921 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1991).
192. Id. at 589.
193. Id. at 590-91.
194. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 607.
195. 808 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
196. Id. at 733.
197. Id. at 732-34.
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tive.198 The amendment effects two changes to Rule 609(a). First, the re-
striction that evidence of a conviction may only be elicited on cross-
examination was eliminated.1 99 Second, the change clarifies the distinction
between impeachment of an accused who choses to testify and impeachment
of other witnesses. 20°
Texas Rule 611 (a) gives the trial court broad discretion to exercise control
over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence.
For example, a trial court may, pursuant to Texas Rule 611 (a)(2), grant a
motion to the effect that one defendant's objection preserves error for all
defendants. 20 Such a ruling eliminates time consuming objections from
multiple defendants and enables each defendant to rely on any other defend-
ant's objections as if it were his own.202
In Miles v. Olin Corp. 20 3 the Fifth Circuit noted that the district court, in
exercising its discretion under Federal Rule 611 (a), must maintain both ob-
jectivity and the appearance of neutrality when it intervenes to terminate the
examination of a witness. 2°4 Still, the trial court's latitude is wide. In Miles
the court determined that the district court's comments concerning the re-
dundant, repetitive and argumentative nature of counsel's cross-examination
were supported by the record and well within the bounds of acceptable
conduct. 205
VII. ARTICLE VII - OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
As expected, there was significant activity during the Survey period in the
area of expert opinion testimony. Generally, the cases signal stricter scru-
tiny by the courts prior to admitting opinion testimony. Of interest are the
proposed amendments to Federal Rules 702 and 705. These were proposed
on June 13, 1991, by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
the Judicial Conference of the United States. 2°6 The Advisory Committee
198. Rule 609 now reads as follows:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such
a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admit-
ted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
FED. R. EVID. 609(a) (as amended by order of the United States Supreme Court dated January
26, 1990, effective December 1, 1990).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See Celotex Corp. v. Tate, 797 S.W.2d 197, 201 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no
writ).
202. Id. at 201-02.
203. 922 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1991).
204. Id. at 1228.
205. Id. at 1228-29.
206. See Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence, cited at 112 S.Ct.
CXCV-CXCVII. The text of the proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 702 reads as follows:
Testimony providing scientific, technical, or other specialized information, in
1360 [Vol. 45
CIVIL EVIDENCE
Notes specify that the amendment is intended to limit the use, but increase
the utility and reliability, of party-initiated opinion testimony bearing on sci-
entific and technical issues.207 The Advisory Committee Notes indicate that
the proposed amendment to Rule 705208 will eliminate a conflict with pro-
posed Rule 702 which endorses prior disclosure of underlying facts.2°9
Texas Rule 701 provides that the testimony of a lay witness in the form of
opinions or inferences is limited to those which are either rationally based on
the perception of the witness or are helpful to a clear understanding of his
testimony regarding the fact at issue.210 In E-Z Mart Stores, Inc. v. Hav-
ner 211 defendant appealed a jury finding that its negligence was a proximate
cause of a store clerk's death.212 In that case, a store clerk working the late
shift at E-Z Mart disappeared sometime during the night and was found
dead five days later.213 A police officer offered an opinion on behalf of the
estate that if there had been a security system which had sounded an alarm
in the police station, the clerk would be alive today.214 The Texarkana court
of appeals held that the officer's opinion was not based upon his perception
of the facts and was pure speculation. 215
Another witness, who was qualified as an alarm expert under Texas Rule
702, also gave an opinion that the clerk would likely be alive had there been
an alarm system at E-Z Mart at the time of her death.216 Texas Rule 702
provides that in order to give an opinion concerning specialized knowledge,
a witness must be qualified as an expert by virtue of his knowledge, skill,
experience, training or education.217 The court determined that the alarm
expert's opinion was also based merely upon his speculation or feelings about
non-scientific and non-technical matters and did not constitute probative ev-
idence of proximate cause.218 Accordingly, the appellate court disregarded
the form of an opinion or otherwise, may be permitted only if (1) the informa-
tion is reasonably reliable and will substantially assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue and (2) the witness is qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to provide
such testimony. Except with leave of court for good cause shown, the witness
shall not testify on direct examination in any civil action to any opinion or infer-
ence, or reason or basis therefor, that has not been seasonably disclosed as re-
quired by Rules 26(a)(2) and 26(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Id. at CXCV.
207. Id.
208. The proposed amendment to Federal Rule 705 reads as follows:
The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give reasons there-
fore without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court re-
quires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.
Id. at CXCVII.
209. Id.
210. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 701.
211. 797 S.W.2d 116 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1990, writ granted).
212. Id. at 117.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 119.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 702.
218. E-Z Mart, 797 S.W.2d at 119.
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these opinions and held that there was insufficient evidence from which rea-
sonable minds could infer that E-Z Mart's conduct was a cause in fact of the
clerk's death.2 19 Thus, the court reversed the jury verdict. 220
In Jones v. Jones,22' a divorce action, the Texarkana court of appeals, cit-
ing Texas Rule 701, held that the trial court properly admitted the wife's
testimony to the effect that her husband would have beaten her if she had
not executed certain deeds transferring title to marital property.222 The Tex-
arkana court noted that there was extensive evidence in the record to sup-
port her fears of violence and determined that her testimony was an
admissible opinion rationally based on her knowledge under Rule 701.223
Hence, the key to such situations is the question of speculation.
In a significant opinion, Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp. ,224 a divided
Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court's exclusion of crucial
expert testimony in a wrongful death action brought under the substantive
law of Texas.225 In Christophersen the plaintiffs alleged that the deceased
employee contracted colon cancer as a result of his repeated exposure to
nickel and cadmium at a Marathon Manufacturing Company plant in Waco,
Texas. 226 In response to defendant Marathon's motion for summary judg-
ment, plaintiffs presented the affidavit of their expert witness who concluded
that the decedent's exposure at Marathon caused the cancer resulting in his
death.227 The district court determined that the expert's opinion, which was
the sole evidence of causation, should be excluded and granted Marathon's
motion for summary judgment. 228
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit established a four-step approach for deter-
mining the admissibility of expert testimony. 229 First, the trial court must
determine whether the witness is qualified under Federal Rule 702 to express
an expert opinion. 230 Second, the trial court must determine whether the
facts upon which the expert relies are the same type as those relied upon by
other experts in the field, as required by Federal Rule 703.231 Third, the
district court must determine whether the expert, in reaching his conclusion,
used a well-founded methodology. 232 Once the expert testimony has passed
the first three tests, the district court must screen the testimony under Fed-
eral Rule 403 to determine whether the testimony's potential for unfair prej-
219. Id. at 119-20.
220. Id.
221. 804 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
222. Id. at 627.
223. Id.
224. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert.
filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S. Nov. 12, 1991) (No. 91-785).
225. Id. at 1108.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 1109.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1110 (the en banc Fifth Circuit reversed the prior panel decision).
230. Id.
231. Id.




udice substantially outweighs its probative value.233 Significantly, the
Christophersen opinion endorses careful scrutiny at each step of the inquiry
prior to allowing the admission of expert testimony.234
Having so stated, the Fifth Circuit then affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of plaintiff's expert's testimony based on both Rule 703 and the Frye test.235
Applying Federal Rule 703, the Fifth Circuit held that where the factual
information underlying an expert's opinion is found to be critically incom-
plete or grossly inaccurate, a district court may exclude the expert's opinion
altogether.236 The Fifth Circuit stated that "[d]istrict judges may reject
opinions founded on critical facts that are plainly untrustworthy, principally
because such an opinion cannot be helpful to the jury. '237
In discussing the Frye test, the Fifth Circuit stated that the trial court
should ask "whether the methodology or reasoning that the expert uses to
connect the facts to his conclusion is generally accepted within the relevant
scientific community. '238 Applying that standard to the case at bar, the
court determined that the methodology used by plaintiff's expert lacked sup-
port in the scientific community.239 The Fifth Circuit also noted that the
trial judge, applying Federal Rule 702, properly scrutinized the expert's lack
of specialized experience and knowledge in the particular area for which he
was providing an opinion.24°
In Slaughter v. Southern Talc Co. 241 the Fifth Circuit construed the re-
quirements of Federal Rule 703. The panel affirmed the trial court's exclu-
sion of expert testimony under Rule 703 because the reports relied on by the
experts contained many obvious errors, which would cause his testimony to
be of no value to the trier of fact.242 The panel also rejected the appellant's
contention that Federal Rule 705 does not require that factual support for
the expert's opinion expressed in an affidavit be contained therein.243
Ramsey v. Jones Enterprises2 " involved a dispute between several parties
with regard to the title to certain real property.245 The Beaumont court held
that the trial court erred in allowing the prevailing party to prove up title by
nothing more than the oral expert testimony of an attorney. 246 The Beau-
mont court then stated that where documents pertaining to title exist, the
testimony of an expert witness, standing alone, constitutes no evidence what-
soever as to title.247 Although the case is significant to the practitioner as an
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 1113-16.
236. Id. at 1114.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1115.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1112-13.
241. 919 F.2d 304 (5th Cir. 1990).
242. Id. at 307.
243. Id. at 307 n.4.
244. 810 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
245. Id. at 903.
246. Id. at 904.
247. Id. at 905.
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example of the pitfalls that may exist for the inexact and unprepared lawyer,
Ramsey should not be read to preclude testimony by an expert as to the
ultimate issue to be decided in a case.248
The opinion in White Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive
Joint Venture249 illustrates that a witness qualified by virtue of education to
testify as an expert in one area of expertise, may also be qualified by virtue of
practical experience to testify as an expert in an overlapping area.250 In
White Budd the Beaumont court of appeals sustained the lower court and
held that a witness who was qualified as an engineer by virtue of his educa-
tion could, based on his work experience, also give an opinion with regard to
the professional standard of care for an architect responsible for an architec-
tural project or for a combined engineering and architectural project.251 The
Beaumont court further determined that the expert's testimony and opinion
were probably helpful to the triers of fact as required by Texas Rule of Civil
Evidence 702.252
But, in Prellwitz v. Cromwell, Truemper, Levy, Parker and Woodsmale,
Inc. ,253 another case involving allegations of architectural/engineering mal-
practice, the Dallas court of appeals applied the rule that expert testimony
about the standard of care within a particular licensed profession must come
from one licensed in that profession. 254 In an apparent conflict with White
Budd Van Ness Partnership v. Major-Gladys Drive Joint Venture255 the Dal-
las court stated that because Texas requires a person to obtain a license to
practice as an architect or a registered mechanical engineer, the trial court
appropriately excluded the proffered testimony of two witnesses not licensed
in those professions.256
Texas Rule 704 provides that testimony in the form of an opinion or infer-
ence otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ulti-
mate issue to be decided by the jury. 257 In Harvey v. Culpepper258 the
Corpus Christi court of appeals noted that an expert may state an opinion
on a mixed question of fact and law, so long as the opinion is limited to the
relevant issues and is founded upon proper legal concepts. 25 9 Specifically,
the Corpus Christi court affirmed the trial court's exclusion of the opinion of
defendant's expert that defendant was not negligent, since the expert was not
asked to assume a legally correct definition of negligence before he was asked
248. See TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 704 (opinion on ultimate issue).
249. 798 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd, 811 S.W.2d 541, cert. de-
nied, 112 S.Ct. 180 (1991).
250. Id. at 815-16.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 816.
253. 802 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
254. Id. at 317.
255. 798 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1990, writ dism'd, 811 S.W.2d 541, cert. de-
nied, 112 S.Ct. 180 (1991).
256. Prellwitz, 802 S.W.2d at 318.
257. TEX. R. Civ. E. 704.




that ultimate question in the case.260
In Decker v. Hatfield 261 the Eastland court of appeals considered the rela-
tionship between Texas Rules 703, 705, and 802, where an expert used hear-
say testimony as a basis for his opinion and thereafter was asked to explain
the basis for that opinion. 262 Texas Rule 703 provides that the facts or data
relied on by an expert need not be admissible in evidence if they are of a type
reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences on the subject.263 Texas Rule 705 provides that an expert may
disclose, during examination, the facts or data underlying his opinion. 26 4
The Eastland court distinguished precedent from the Supreme Court of
Texas to the effect that ordinarily an expert witness should not be permitted
to recount a hearsay conversation even if that conversation forms a part of
the basis for his opinion. 265 The Eastland appellate court held that an expert
is entitled to explain the basis for his opinions under Rule 705 even if that
opens the door to hearsay testimony.266 The court specifically noted, how-
ever, that in this case the appellant failed to raise an argument, based on
Texas Rule 403, that the probative value of the testimony was outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice. 267 Hence, the court overruled the appellant's
objection based on hearsay grounds alone.268
VIII. ARTICLE VIII - HEARSAY
During the Survey period, a number of cases were decided which illustrate
the intricacies of the rules governing hearsay. Texas Rule 802 states the
general rule that hearsay, as defined in Rule 801, is not admissible. 269 Texas
Rule 803 provides the exceptions to the general rule.270 In Anthony Pools v.
Charles & David, Inc.271 the Houston court of appeals held that it was error
for the trial court to admit an affidavit made two years prior to the affiant's
deposition. 272 The court reasoned that the affidavit was hearsay and that its
proponent failed to qualify it under any of the exceptions listed under Texas
Rule 803.273 In Worley v. Butler27 4 a suit by an attorney to recover legal
fees incurred in bringing a lawsuit, the Corpus Christi court of appeals held
260. Id. at 601.
261. 798 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1990, writ dism'd w.o.j.).
262. Id. at 638-39.
263. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 703. The first sentence of Texas Rule of Civil Evidence 703 was
amended effective September 1, 1990, to conform it to the rules of discovery by replacing the
phrase "made known to him" with "reviewed by the expert." See Vernon's Texas Rules An-
notated, 1991 Special Pamphlet p. 72 (West 1991).
264. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 705.
265. Decker, 798 S.W.2d at 638 (citing Birchfield v. Texarkana Memorial Hosp., 747
S.W.2d 361, 365 (Tex. 1987)).
266. Id. at 639.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 802.
270. TEX. R. Civ. EVID. 803.
271. 797 S.W.2d 666 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ denied).
272. Id. at 676.
273. Id.
274. 809 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
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that the transcript of the client's testimony during that prior lawsuit as to his
fee arrangement was not hearsay. 275 The Corpus Christi court determined
that the client's prior testimony constituted an admission by a party-oppo-
nent within the meaning of Texas Rule 801(e)(2)(A), because it was made in
his individual capacity. 27 6
In Rosendorf v. Blackmon 27 7 a suit involving a dispute over custody of a
minor child, the trial court admitted testimony by one parent and also from
a child protective services specialist, to the effect that the child had made
statements to them suggesting sexual abuse by the other parent. 278 The
Corpus Christi court of appeals reversed, holding that the statements were
inadmissible hearsay.279 Specifically, the Corpus Christi court held that the
statements were not admissible under Texas Rule 801(e)(2), as admissions by
a party-opponent, because the statements were not offered against the child-
declarant. 28 0 The court further held that the child's statements were not
admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule 803(a)(2) because the
child's statements were not spontaneous utterances made under the immedi-
ate influence of an exciting event. 281 Rather, the alleged abuse preceded the
alleged statements by several weeks.28 2
In Marshall v. Telecommunications Specialists, Inc. 283 the Houston court
of appeals (lst Dist.) reversed the judgment of the trial court, which was
based primarily upon hearsay testimony. 28 4 The suit involved a dispute over
alleged unpaid rentals under a lease agreement. 28 5 The only evidence of the
amount of the unpaid rentals was the testimony of the appellee's collection
department supervisor from a document not admitted into evidence. 28 6 The
court reasoned that because the document was a statement made by some-
one other than the witness, and the material derived from the document was
offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, the testimony
was inadmissible hearsay as defined in Texas Rule 801(d).28 7
Federal Rule 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement is not hearsay if it is
offered against a party and is a statement by the party's agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made
during the existence of the relationship. 288 In Sanford v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp. 289 the Fifth Circuit's determination under Federal Rule
275. Id. at 245.
276. Id.
277. 800 S.W.2d 377, (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ).
278. Id. at 379-80.




283. 806 S.W.2d 904 (Tex. App.-Houston (st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
284. Id. at 906.
285. Id. at 905-06.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 906.
288. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). The corresponding provision in the Texas rules is Texas
Rule of Civil Evidence 801(e)(2)(D).
289. 923 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1991).
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801(d)(2)(D) that a report introduced at trial was properly admitted turned
on the application of the Texas law of agency. 290 In this asbestosis case,
plaintiff went to the office of defendant's testifying expert physician for the
purposes of an examination. 291 When the expert witness was unavailable,
his partner performed an examination of plaintiff which revealed asbesto-
sis. 292 Remarkably, a subsequent examination by the expert witness found
no evidence of asbestosis. 293 The trial court ruled the report by the expert
witness' partner inadmissible. The Fifth Circuit held that the report was
properly excluded and did not fall within Rule 801(d)(2)(D), because the
expert witness' partner was not an agent of the nine defendant asbestos man-
ufacturers under Texas law. 294 Under Texas law, an agent is a person au-
thorized to act for and on behalf of the principal, subject to the principal's
control.29 5
In Cooke v. Dykstra 296 the Houston court of appeals held that a document
offered for the limited purpose of showing reliance on a statement in the
document by a party was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted in the document. 297 In C & H Nationwide, Inc.
v. Thompson 29 8 the Houston court of appeals determined that the two prior
written statements offered were statements other than ones made by the wit-
ness while testifying, offered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted, and therefore hearsay as defined in Texas Rule 801(d). 2 9 9 How-
ever, the court held that it was harmless error for the trial court to admit the
statements into evidence. 300 The statements were admitted after the witness'
deposition testimony was read into evidence and were consistent with that
deposition testimony. 30 1 In Reviea v. Marine Drilling Co. 3 0 2 the Corpus
Christi court of appeals held that testimony which technically constituted
hearsay within hearsay was, nevertheless, admissible. 30 3 Texas Rule 805
provides that hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded as hearsay if
both statements fall within a hearsay exception. 3° 4 In Reviea a personal in-
jury action under the Jones Act, a claims investigator testified that a co-
worker of plaintiff told the claims investigator that plaintiff had complained
to the co-worker of a prior knee injury.305
290. Id. at 1149-50.
291. Id. at 1149.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1149-50.
295. Id. at 1149 (citing Lubbock Feed Lots, Inc. v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 630 F.2d
250, 269 (5th Cir. 1980)).
296. 800 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, opinion corrected and modi-
fied on reh'g 1990 WL 310627 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1990).
297. Id. at 562.
298. 810 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ requested).
299. Id.
300. Id. at 268.
301. Id.
302. 800 S.W.2d 252 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1990, writ denied).
303. Id. at 257.
304. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 805.
305. Reviea, 800 S.W.2d at 257.
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In its analysis, the Corpus Christi court determined that the statement by
plaintiff to the co-worker was a statement by a party offered against a party
and therefore admissible under Texas Rule 801(e)(2)(A). 3a 6 Ordinarily, the
statement by the claims investigator relating the co-worker's statement
would be inadmissible hearsay, but in this case, the co-worker testified at
trial and was subject to cross-examination concerning his statement about
plaintiff's prior knee injury.30 7 The co-worker's testimony at trial was con-
sistent with his statement to the claims investigator, but was alleged to have
been fabricated.3 08 The court held that the claims investigator's testimony
was admissible pursuant to Texas Rule 801(e)(1)(B) as a prior consistent
statement offered to rebut plaintiff's implied charge of recent fabrication of
the testimony at trial.a° 9
In In re Marriage of D. M. B.,310 a custody proceeding, the trial court
excluded double hearsay statements reflected in the records of an examining
psychologist which were allegedly made to the psychologist by the minor
child. 31' Without deciding the hearsay issues, the Amarillo court of appeals
held that the Texas Rules did not eliminate the common law requirement
that in a custody proceeding, any testimony by a child as to its preference
may only be received if the child is of a sufficiently mature age to make
reliable expressions of his or her preferences.3 1 2 The Amarillo court then
determined that the eight-year-old child was not yet of a mature enough age
to testify as to preference.31 3 Therefore, the testimony by the psychologist,
as reflected in his report, was inadmissible. 31 4
In Wilson v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. 315 the Fifth Circuit addressed a double
hearsay problem in the context of the business record exception of Federal
Rule 803(6).316 The trial court admitted a written record of statements
made by plaintiff's sister to a hospital social worker to the effect that plaintiff
was a habitual liar.31 7 The Fifth Circuit noted that if the source of the infor-
mation and the recorder of the information are acting in the regular course
of business, the multiple hearsay is allowed in under Federal Rule 803(6). 318
The court, however, looked at the two levels of hearsay separately. The
court found first, that the record made by the social worker fell within the




309. Id. Texas Rule 801(e)(l)(B) provides, in part, that a statement is not hearsay if the
declarant testifies at the trial, is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the
statement is consistent with this testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge
against him of recent fabrication. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 801(e)(1)(B).
310. 798 S.W.2d 399 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1990, no writ).
311. Id. at 401.
312. Id. at 402-03.
313. Id. at 403.
314. Id.
315. 939 F.2d 260 (5th Cir. 1991)
316. Id. at 271.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 271-72.
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worker may have been admissible under Rule 803(4) as statements made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. 320 Nonetheless, the Fifth Cir-
cuit stated that even though the credibility of the patient was important to
the treating psychiatrists, the value of the statements may have been com-
promised by their generality and conclusory nature.32' Despite this, the
Fifth Circuit still held that even if the admission of the statements was error,
it was harmless error in this case.322
In Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co. 323 the Fifth Circuit affirmed a number of
rulings by the district court excluding evidence on hearsay grounds. The
Rock panel focused on the trustworthiness, or lack thereof, of the proferred
hearsay statements. 324 In Rock, an employee of an offshore catering service
alleged that he was injured when his foot fell through a rusted step on an oil
platform and that the injury was later aggravated when he slipped and fell
on a greasy spot on a drilling rig. 3 2 5 Mr. Rock eventually died from a heart
attack, which was allegedly caused in part by circulatory problems arising
from his ankle injury.326 In response to summary judgment motions filed by
defendants, plaintiff offered statements made by Rock to physicians treating
his ankle and memorialized in their medical logs. 3 27 The Fifth Circuit up-
held the district court's exclusion of the statements on hearsay grounds, find-
ing that the hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis, found in Federal Rule 803(4), did not apply.3 2 8 The Fifth Circuit
stated that the "[a]dmissibility of a statement made to one's physician turns
on the guarantee of the absent declarant's trustworthiness. 3 29 The Fifth
Circuit then engaged in a review of the physician's deposition testimony to
determine whether plaintiff's statements concerning the cause of his injuries
were pertinent and therefore trustworthy. 330 Because the court concluded
the statements were not pertinent to the physicians' diagnosis and treatment,
the court found were not trustworthy and therefore inadmissible under Rule
803(4).33 1
The Rock panel also rejected plaintiff's argument that the hearsay state-
ments fell within the business record exception found in Rule 803(6).332 The
Fifth Circuit determined that because Rock was not acting in the regular
course of business when he made his statements to the doctors, Rule 803(6)
did not apply. 333 The Fifth Circuit endorsed the proposition that if anyone
320. Id.
321. Id. at 272.
322. Id.
323. 922 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1991).
324. Id. at 277-83.
325. Id. at 275-76.
326. Id. at 276. Mr. Rock's wife then became the plaintiff, individually, as executrix, and
on behalf of two minor children. Id. at 277.
327. Id. at 277.
328. Id. at 277-78.
329. Id. at 277.
330. Id. at 278.
331. Id.




participating in the record keeping process was not acting in the regular
course of his business, the records are not admissible under Rule 803(6). 334
In Rock plaintiff also tendered copies of various accident reports and logs
prepared with respect to his injuries.335 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial
court's holding that none of the reports and logs fit into any of the hearsay
exceptions of Rule 803, including Rule 803(3).336 The Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that Rock's statements reflecting his state of mind were not admissi-
ble under Rule 803(3), because his state of mind was not at issue in the
case. 337 The Rock panel also found that due to evidence of Rock's motive to
fabricate his statements, which were made to defendants' supervisory per-
sonnel, there was too great a risk of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness to
permit admission under any provision of Rule 803.338
Plaintiff in Rock also sought admission of the accident reports filed by
defendants on the theory that they constituted admissions of a party-oppo-
nent under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2). 339 The Fifth Circuit re-
jected this argument as well, holding that the reports merely documented
Rock's account of his injuries and there was no evidence to suggest that they
were adopted by defendants.3a4 Finally, plaintiff also tendered statements by
family members concerning Rock's account of the injury, arguing that they
fell within the residual hearsay exceptions found in Federal Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5). 341 The Fifth Circuit determined, however, that the state-
ments were properly excluded on the ground that they lacked the circum-
stantial guarantees of trustworthiness required by those Rules.342 The panel
concluded that testimony by family members of a deceased person relating
to statements the person, made prior to death, and that go to the cause of his
injury are inherently unreliable.343
In Fibreboard Corp. v. Pool 344 a personal injury case linked to asbestos the
Texarkana court of appeals held that it was error for the trial court to admit
a poster prepared by a third party illustrating the hazards of asbestos, be-
cause the poster was inadmissible hearsay. 345 Appellees asserted on appeal
that the poster was admissible under the public records exception of Texas
Rule 803(8).346 Rule 803(8) provides that public records and reports meet-
ing the requirements of the rule are not excluded as hearsay despite the
availability of the declarant. 347 The Texarkana court held that the poster,
which was on file with the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 279-81.
337. Id. at 279.
338. Id. at 280.
339. Id. at 281.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id. at 282.
343. Id.
344. 813 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, no writ).
345. Id. at 676.
346. Id.
347. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 803(8).
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and adopted by the United States Department of Labor, was not admissible
under the Rule 803(8) because the exhibit was not prepared by either public
officials, or employees under their supervision, in the performance of their
official duties.348 The court noted further that even if the poster had been
prepared by a public official, it still did not meet the test of Rule 803(8)
because it did not purport to set forth (1) activities of OSHA, (2) matters
observed pursuant to a duty imposed by law, or (3) factual findings resulting
from an investigation authorized by law. 349
In Castro v. Sebesta 350 the Houston court of appeals held that the trial
court erroneously excluded defendant's driving record since it was a public
record within the meaning of Rule 803(8).351 The Houston court held fur-
ther, however, that defendant's urine analysis report was properly excluded
since the report was never properly authenticated. 35 2 In Bingham v. Bing-
ham, another case construing Rule 803(8), the Fort Worth court of appeals
held that a portion of a court-ordered study conducted by a non-testifying
social worker was properly admitted. 353 The Fort Worth court determined
that the study constituted both matters observed pursuant to a duty imposed
by law under Rule 803(8)(B), and factual findings resulting from an investi-
gation pursuant to lawful authority under Rule 803(8)(C).354
In Moss v. Ole South Real Estate, Inc. 355 a civil rights action alleging ra-
cial discrimination, the Fifth Circuit interpreted the federal version of the
public records exception to the hearsay rule found in Federal Rule 803(8).356
The Fifth Circuit criticized the analysis of the magistrate below, which was
used to exclude findings of discrimination made by the Department of Hous-
ing and Urban Development and the Air Force.357 The court noted that
opinions and conclusions of public agencies, as well as facts, fall within the
public records exception of Rule 803(8)(C). a58 The Fifth Circuit also stated
that agency evaluative reports are presumed admissible under Rule
803(8)(C) unless there are indications of untrustworthiness.3 59 The court
determined that the magistrate overstepped his role by assessing the credibil-
ity of the witnesses interviewed by the agencies.36 0
The Fifth Circuit opined that the proper focus is upon the reliability of the
reports, as reflected by the preparation process. 361 The court endorsed a
four step analysis in determining the trustworthiness of evaluative reports:
"(1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special skill or expertise of the
348. Fibreboard, 813 S.W.2d at 676.
349. Id.
350. 808 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
351. Id. at 195.
352. Id. at 195-96.
353. 811 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, no writ).
354. Id.
355. 933 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1991).
356. Id. at 1305.
357. Id. at 1305-09.
358. Id. at 1305.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 1306-07.
361. Id. at 1307.
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official; (3) whether a hearing was held and at what level; and (4) possible
motivational problems. ' 362 After applying these four factors to the reports
in issue, the court determined that the HUD report was untrustworthy and
inadmissible in its entirety, but that the factual findings in the Air Force
reports were trustworthy and admissible. 363
In Harris County v. Allwaste Tank Cleaning, Inc. 364 the Houston court of
appeals construed Texas Rule 803(10), which permits admission of proof of
the absence of a public record despite its hearsay nature.365 Aliwaste in-
volved a suit by the county against a polluter for operating without a re-
quired permit. 366 Plaintiff sought to introduce an affidavit of a director of
the Air Control Board stating that a diligent search failed to indicate any
trace of a special permit exemption or any other type of authorization.3 67
The purpose for which plaintiff sought to introduce the affidavit was to
prove that the phrase "or any other authorization" meant that the director
signing the affidavit construed a particular order not to grant the authority
equivalent to a permit. 368 The Houston court held that plaintiff's reason for
offering the affidavit rendered it hearsay when measured against the purpose
of Texas Rule 803(00).369 Accordingly, the Houston court of appeals sus-
tained the trial court's exclusion of the affidavit. 3
7 0
IX. ARTICLE IX - AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Texas Rule 901(a) provides that the requirement of authentication or
identification, as a condition precedent to admissibility, is satisfied by evi-
dence which supports a finding that the matter in question is what is
claimed.371 In City of Mesquite v. Moore372 the Dallas court of appeals held
that a document was properly authenticated by virtue of having been ac-
companied by a cover letter from the party seeking to exclude the evi-
dence. 37 3 In Steenbergen v. Ford Motor Co., 374 a wrongful death action, the
Dallas court of appeals upheld the trial court's exclusion of a number of
documents produced by defendant in response to a discovery request.375
The court noted that a number of the documents were not created by de-
fendant and that no witness vouched for their accuracy. 376 In Steenbergen
plaintiff also sought to admit, pursuant to Texas Rule 901(b)(4), crash test
362. Id. at 1305, 1307.
363. Id. at 1310.
364. 808 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ dism'd w.o.j.).






371. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 901(a).
372. 800 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ).
373. Id. at 619.
374. 814 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ requested).
375. Id. at 760.
376. Id.
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data bearing the Ford logo and other distinctive characteristics. 377 The
court of appeals upheld the trial court's exclusion of the crash test data be-
cause plaintiff's expert had obtained it from an attorney in another case in-
volving defendant and the expert could not verify that the data had not been
altered. 378
In Castro v. Sebesta 379 the Houston court of appeals (1st Dist.) held that a
party's driving record was properly authenticated in accordance with Texas
Rule 902(4) because it was certified by the custodian of records. 380 A urine
analysis report, however, was not properly authenticated because no offering
witness vouched for its authenticity under Texas Rule 901 and it was not
self-authenticating under Rule 902.381 Texas Rule 901(b)(6) and the iden-
tical Federal Rule 901(b)(6), illustrate the means for authenticating tele-
phone calls. In First State Bank v. Maryland Casualty Co. 38 2 the Fifth
Circuit rejected appellant's challenge to the admission of a telephone conver-
sation made on the ground that the call was not properly authenticated. 383
The court noted that the illustrations listed under Federal Rule 901(b) are
not the exclusive means of identification or authentication.384 The Fifth Cir-
cuit ruled that to authenticate a telephone call, a party need only present
sufficient evidence of authenticity to make a prima facie case and to allow
the issue of identity to be decided by the jury. 385 The panel held that this
requirement was satisfied where the caller testified that she dialed the correct
number, that a person answered the phone giving the last name of the resi-
dents, and that the person answering then stated that a particular resident
was not home.386 The Fifth Circuit also rejected challenges to the hearsay
nature of the testimony, citing Federal Rules 803(1) and 803(24).387
X. ARTICLE X - CONTENTS OF WRITING, RECORDINGS AND
PHOTOGRAPHS
Texas Rule 1002, otherwise known as the best evidence rule, provides that
to prove a writing's content, or the content of a recording or photograph, the
original writing, recording or photograph is required, except as otherwise
provided in the rules or by law.38 8 In Ramsey v. Jones Enterprises38 9 the
Beaumont court of appeals held that in actions where title of property is the
ultimate issue for determination, proof of such title must be shown by the
377. Id. at 761.
378. Id.
379. 808 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
380. Id. at 195.
381. Id. at 195-96.
382. 918 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1990).




387. Id. at 41-42.
388. TEX. R. Civ. EvID. 1002.
389. 810 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1991, writ denied).
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instruments of title themselves. 390 The court opined that Rule 1002 requires
that if documentary evidence exists as to title to real property, such docu-
mentary evidence must be produced and admitted. 391 The court also held
that hearsay testimony may not be used as a substitute for the title docu-
ments without a proper showing that the documents were unavailable
through no fault or failure on the part of the party offering the hearsay testi-
mony. 392 In contrast, in Harris v. Varo Inc.,393 the Dallas court of appeals
held that the best evidence rule requires that the original writing be
presented only when the writing is offered to prove the contents of the origi-
nal writing.394 The existence of a document may be proved by affidavit. 395
390. Id. at 905.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. 814 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
394. Id. at 523.
395. Id.
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